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Abstract 
The liberalization of the electricity market in the EU is aimed at creating a 
competitive market in order to increase economic efficiency and reduce the role 
of the state. For a long period of time, the electricity sector in the EU member 
states was organized in the form of a natural vertically integrated state-owned 
monopoly. It proved to be ineffective in terms of ensuring the (competitive) 
market price of electricity. With technological advances in electricity generation 
and transmission, the reform of the electricity sector became possible and 
unavoidable. Namely, all production and development activities rely on the use of 
energy, i.e. electricity in most cases, which makes this type of energy 
irreplaceable by other energy sources. Given the increased level of electricity 
usage and the interconnectedness of economic growth and electric power system 
development, it is important to stress the need for a consistent liberalization of 
the EU electricity market within the context of Electricity Directives. The reason 
lies in the fact that a mere enforcement of Electricity Directives, together with 
other supporting regulations, represents a means towards creating a fully 
functional internal electricity market. The same applies in the case of the 
Croatian electricity market. 
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1 This article is the result of the scientific project “Economic impacts of regulatory reforms in 
electricity sector” n° 081-0361557-1455, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and 
Sports. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Liberalization of the electricity supply industry is a process consisting of 
several measures (restructuring of the sector, introduction of competition, 
establishment of an independent regulator, market regulation, and privatisation) 
which need to be properly implemented in order to successfully reform this 
vertically integrated industry into a competitive one. The reason lies in the fact 
that competition leads to increased innovation, flexibility and efficiency in the 
production as well as price reduction.  
In context of the European Union, this implies creating an efficient and 
cost-effective electricity sector followed by a fully opened, competitive and 
interest-balanced market structure. The EU itself, from the very beginnings of the 
electricity market liberalization, believes that competition will result in lower 
electricity prices for both industrial and residential consumers. Moreover, it is 
anticipated that it will increase the quality of service leading to a more efficient 
usage of natural resources. The three energy packages and their pertaining 
electricity directives are all about creating a uniformed electricity market, 
increasing competition and efficiency as well as ensuring secure electricity 
supply. The last EU energy package aims to take this ongoing process even 
further and finally improve the functioning of the internal electricity market and 
to put a close to what appears to be one of the important economic and political 
objectives. However, it still remains to be determined and analysed to what extent 
and whether the implementation of the third Electricity Directive will lead to a 
possible convergence of the electricity market in terms of benefits for every 
single EU citizen (greater choice and improved consumer rights, fairer prices, 
cleaner energy and security of supply). Therefore, the aim of this paper is to 
define the past and present efforts regarding the establishment of a competitive 
electricity market in the European Union. An overview regarding Croatia’s 
efforts in liberalizing the electricity market is also given within this paper. 
The paper is structured as follows. After the introduction comes the 
second part which thoroughly studies the liberalization of the EU electricity 
market through the elaboration of the past and present electricity directives. The 
third part describes previous efforts and new implications regarding electricity 
sector reform in Croatia. The last part draws the conclusions which have been 
identified in this paper. 
 
 
2. EU ELECTRICITY DIRECTIVES: 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 
 The very creation of the internal electricity market in the EU began in the 
early 1990’s in an atmosphere of reduced political concern over energy supply 
security (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005) and with the Directive on the Transit of 
Electricity through Transmission Grids whose main goal was to assure that the 
network operator in one member state does not interfere with the exchange of 
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electricity between other member states (Tominov, 2008). At that time, the EU 
member states started to organize their electricity sectors in accordance with the 
political and economic developments resulting thus in a large variety of the 
overall sector organizations (Udovičić, 2005) in which the common rules for the 
electricity market in a form of directives were still not adopted.  
 
2.1.  Directive 96/92/EC 
Although the first draft of the Electricity Directive, with clearly stated 
principles of free electricity trade between member states and third-party network 
access, was issued in 1992, it was not until 1996 when the first Electricity 
Directive (96/92/EC2) was passed. It created the necessary preconditions for the 
liberalization of the electricity sector within the EU and the abandoning of the 
idea of national sovereignty over electrical energy. This electricity directive gives 
the absolute advantage to competition and free trade. At the same time, electricity 
industry is regarded as any other activity in which competition encouragement 
promotes efficiency, lower electricity prices and increased security of electricity 
supply, as it stimulates private investments in the electricity sector together with 
the reduction of state’s involvement via independent regulatory agencies 
(Višković, 2005; Tešnjak, Banovac and Kuzle, 2009). 
According to Jamasb and Pollitt (2005, p. 6), the European electricity 
sector liberalization was pursued at two parallel levels. The first one was under 
Electricity Directives which were designed to enable electricity companies from 
across the EU member states to compete with the so-called national incumbents. 
The second level of electricity sector liberalization dealt with improving 
interconnections between member states by improving cross-border trading rules 
and expanding cross-border transmission links which will ultimately reduce 
cross-border transport costs and increase competition. 
As it was stated earlier, today’s internal electricity market of the 
European Union was established by the Directive 96/92/EC which was passed 
after five years of negotiation, opposition and compromises among member 
states. The Directive went into force in February 1997 and the member states 
were required to include its provisions in their national law by February 1999.3 
Only Belgium, Greece and Ireland were given longer deadlines due to the specific 
technical features of their electricity sector (small sectors with few international 
interconnections). Tominov (2008) and Teodorović, Aralica and Redžepagić 
(2006) argue that the main goal of this Directive was to establish rules for 
electricity production, transmission, distribution and supply as well to establish 
rules regarding the organization and operation of the electricity sector, market 
access, criteria and procedures for public tenders together with issuing 
authorization for the construction of new generating facilities. Thomas (2006) 
                                                 
2 Original name of the directive: Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. 
3 For more details see Official Journal of the European Union L 027, 1997. 
EKON. MISAO PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXI. (2012.) BR. 1. (315-338)      Jakovac, P.: ELECTRICITY DIRECTIVES AND... 
 318 
gives a deeper analysis regarding these interest areas. In terms of constructing 
new generating capacities, member states were given two options. On one hand, 
they can authorize constructors of new generating capacities in compliance with 
national planning law for any industrial facility or on the other, announce tenders 
where an official authority determines the needed generating capacities and 
allocates the construction through an open, non-discriminatory process.  
The Directive 96/92/EC also required the unbundling of previously 
vertically integrated monopolistic companies and the creation of new market 
participants, especially in terms of Transmission and Distribution System 
Operators which had to be separate from the competitive parts of the electricity 
sector. In terms of retail competition, the electricity consumers (manly large and 
medium) got the opportunity to choose or change their suppliers. According to 
Tešnjak, Banovac and Kuzle (2009) as well as Vlahinić-Dizdarević, Host and 
Galović (2009), electricity market opening began in 1999 enabling those 
consumers using over 40 GWh per year to choose the electricity supplier. This 
resulted in an opening of approximately 26.5% of the European Union electricity 
market to foreign suppliers. Additionally, in the year 2000, the level for achieving 
the preferred consumer status was lowered to 20 GWh of the overall annual 
electricity consumption resulting in an opening up to 28%. Finally, in the year 
2003, all electricity consumers with annual electricity consumption greater than 9 
GWh had the preferred consumer status (33% market opening).  
Regarding retail competition, it is worth mentioning that although this 
Directive required the member states to encourage competition as the basic 
criterion that will enable the functioning of the electricity market, it did not 
impose a completely opened market due to protection of national or local 
solidarity through various forms of state intervention (Višković, 2005, p. 30). 
However, it provided the possibility of achieving fully effective electricity market 
within nine years of the Directive’s entry into force. The last area dealt within the 
Directive 96/92/EC dealt with network access requiring the Transmission and 
Distribution System Operators to grant non-discriminatory network access under 
either negotiated third party access (generators and retail suppliers negotiate 
network access with the system operator), regulated third party access (generators 
and retail suppliers are allowed to access the network at previously published 
tariffs) or under the “single buyer” option where, as the name implies, a single 
buyer previously designated by the member state would be responsible for 
purchasing electricity for overall country’s needs as would determine which 
power plants were to be used.  
The introduction of Directive 96/92/EC had created many serious 
problems because of the asymmetry among the member countries. The main 
inequality in gaining access to the national market refers to the degree of market 
openness and the type of network access (Višković, 2005, p. 33). The reason lies 
in the fact that the unbundling requirements did not guarantee independence of 
network access whereas the negotiated third party access option offered the 
incumbent companies a way of keeping out the competitors. Thomas (2005) 
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states that there was nothing that required countries to create a competitive field 
of companies in generation or retail. This resulted in a concentrated retail sector 
and restricted retail competition. Although the Directive tried to ensure an 
indiscriminate network access (even with three different access options) it did not 
require a wholesale market to be set up. In other words, there were no provisions 
and possibilities for competitive producers to find a market for their electricity, 
especially in a country with a dominant generator/retailer. This, unfortunately, led 
to minimal chances of entering the market.  
Regarding retail market opening, the provisions on that matter were very 
limited with no more than a few thousand of the very largest consumers being 
able to choose their electricity supplier. General criticism of this Directive refers 
to the fact that member states were given too much leeway when it comes to 
complying with the provisions aimed at creating new market structures. 
Integrated companies needed to do no more than make an accounting separation 
between their network, retail and production activities while at the same time the 
negotiated third party access option allowed to refuse network access on the 
grounds of system security.  
If the Directive sets out the minimal rules and conditions under which 
competition can develop in a fair and transparent way without the violation of 
defined objectives and economic results (Vlahinić-Dizdarević, Host and Galović, 
2009, p. 9), it must be stated that the first Electricity Directive did not set any 
requirements for an independent sector regulator, meaning that there was no 
constant sector surveillance nor an “independent eye” to ensure that the rules 
were followed. 
From the practical point of view, most countries opened their retail market 
much further and more rapidly than it was required. According to Tešnjak, 
Banovac and Kuzle (2009), in the year 2000, around 56% of the EU electricity 
market was already opened. Thomas (2005; 2006) states that by 2001 the 
European Commission was willing to introduce new directives in order to 
accelerate market opening even further and to correct the imperfections of the 
first Directive and firmly and decisively respond to the criticisms regarding 
network access and sector regulation. 
 
2.2.  Directive 2003/54/EC 
The second Electricity Directive (2003/54/EC4), which represented a 
step forward in completing the internal electricity market, was passed in June 
2003. EU member states were required to implement its provisions into their 
national law by 1 July 2004. The idea behind this new directive was in further 
strengthening of EU’s energy policy, in ensuring electricity supply to all 
                                                 
4 Original name of the directive: Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive 96/92/EC. 
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consumers, in full market opening, in higher service standard and business 
efficiency as well as in security of supply and lower electricity prices. Also, this 
Directive further promoted market competition by stronger network access 
regulation and by requiring the establishment of an independent regulatory body 
together with environmental protection and promotion of renewable resources in 
line with the protection of consumers’ fundamental interests. In additional 
explanation why the Directive 96/92/EC was amended with the second Electricity 
Directive, Udovičić (2005, p. 294) argues, in accordance with the very text of the 
second Directive, that specific provisions were needed to ensure equal 
competition in the production segment and to reduce the risk of both market 
dominance and predatory behaviour as well as to guarantee non-discriminatory 
tariffs for transmission and distribution through network access based on the 
tariffs published prior to their entry into force.  
Further analysis of the second Electricity Directive5 shows which new 
requirements were added and/or changed in order to fully cover the areas of 
interest previously set in the first Electricity Directive. In the area of constructing 
new electricity generation capacities, authorization was determined to be the rule 
under which new capacities should be constructed while tendering should only be 
used if authorization procedure would not result in sufficient generating capacity. 
Authorization procedures, which are publicly announced and have a goal of 
easing the market entry, must not become an administrative burden and the 
reason why one’s permission (authorization) is refused has to be objective, non-
discriminatory, well founded and substantiated by adequate evidence.  
In terms of retail competition it was stated that from 1 July 2007, 
electricity market must be fully opened meaning that all electricity consumers 
(non-residential and residential) have the right to choose their electricity 
suppliers, regardless of national boundaries. In order for competition to work, 
access to networks should be non-discriminatory, transparent and under fair 
(market) prices. Non-discriminatory network access granted by the Transmission 
or Distribution System Operator is of a paramount importance for the final 
formation of the internal electricity market. Therefore, the distribution and 
transmission systems must be conducted by legally separated entities. 
Respectively, it means that Distribution and Transmission System Operators must 
be established as independent entities in relation to those subjects engaged in 
electricity production and supply. As stated in Thomas (2006, p. 791), the 
Transmission and Distribution System Operators could be under the same 
corporate ownership as a company active in generation and/or retail, but they 
have to be legally distinct companies.  
In the matter of network access, the negotiated third party access and the 
single buyer option were withdrawn since they had not been adopted to any 
significant extent. As mentioned earlier, the provisions on regulation were much 
stronger and member states were required to appoint an independent sector 
                                                 
5 For more details see Official Journal of the European Union L 176, 2003. 
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regulator that had to have a minimum set of competences but enough power and 
authority to ensure non-discriminatory playing field for all market participants in 
order to promote competition and functioning of the electricity market in a 
transparent, effective and efficient manner.  
The Directive 2003/54/EC was passed in order to eliminate deficiencies 
of the previous Electricity Directive in the areas on network access, unbundling 
and especially regulation, but it still was not explicit on breaking up dominant 
companies and  introducing wholesale electricity markets. Although nearly all 
member states have chosen to ensure competition in the electricity generation 
through a transparent authorisation procedure, there were still no means to sell the 
produced electricity. While electricity generators were able to construct new 
power plants and to access the network, without a competitive and liquid 
wholesale market it is pointless for the electricity generators to even enter the 
market. The second problem refers to Transmission and Distribution System 
Operators and their distinction from companies involved in electricity generation 
and retail. As it was previously mentioned, the operation of the network must be 
carried out by a legally distinct company. However, the problem lies in a fact that 
this very company can still be owned by an entity involved in electricity 
generation and/or electricity retail. The third and the most serious problem refers 
to the fact that there were no specific measures for breaking up dominant 
companies. Although the second Electricity Directive speaks of a need to reduce 
the risks of market dominance and predatory behaviour, it seemed that member 
states and the European Commission were not committed in breaking up the 
control of dominant companies and that they preferred to maintain or allow the 
emergence of the so-called national champions in the electricity sector (Thomas, 
2006).  
The second Electricity Directive also required that member states must 
provide the European Commission with a report on market dominance and anti-
competitive behaviour together with a review of any changes in ownership 
patterns as well as practical measures put in motion in order to enhance 
competition and variety of non-dominate market actors. The European 
Commission also required submission of an annual report to the European 
Parliament on the overall progress in creating a complete and fully operational 
internal electricity market. Moreover, it was not quite clear to what extent 
member states (which should be more active in this area) and the European 
Commission are required to break up dominant companies and their positions. It 
looks like that, although the provisions of the Directive seem strong, a lack of 
will exists among member states and the European Commission when it comes to 
reducing market power and breaking up dominant companies as well as ensuring 
a competitive playing field for all market participants.  
Although previously described Electricity Directives had the role of key 
legislation acts, there are others that also set the rules in the electricity sector. For 
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instance, Directive 2001/77/EC6 is all about promoting electricity produced from 
renewable resources and increasing the share of renewable sources in electricity 
production. This Directive7 explicitly emphasizes that the promotion of renewable 
energy represents a high priority for the EU due to security and diversification of 
energy supply, environmental protection, economic and social cohesion. 
Regulation 1228/2003/EC8 on the other hand was adopted in order to regulate 
transmission of electricity between member states and to establish the 
mechanisms for the compensation of the inter-transmission system operator, the 
principles for its collection as well as for the use of the available interconnection 
capacities among national transmission systems9. There is also the Directive 
2005/89/EC10 which establishes measures aimed at safeguarding security of 
electricity supply and ensuring proper functioning of the internal electricity 
market in terms of adequate level of interconnection between member states and 
adequate level of generation capacity and balance between supply and demand. 
This Directive11 in turn requires network operators to set and meet quality of 
supply and network security performance objectives while member states need to 
encourage the establishment of wholesale electricity markets. 
 
2.3. Overview on the effects of the EU electricity market 
liberalization process 
The overall liberalization process has been progressing rather slowly and 
unevenly across the EU (Vlahinić-Dizdarević, Host and Galović, 2009, p. 8), and 
is still far from being completed, resulting in low level of competition, increased 
market concentration, differences in electricity prices and modest cross-border 
interconnection capacities which represent a barrier to cross-border electricity 
trade. 
The availability of electricity network capacity for cross-border 
transactions is not satisfactory both in terms of new investments and the way in 
which the existing capacities are allocated. Due to insufficient interconnection 
capacity between member states, certain regions such as the Baltic States, the 
Iberian Peninsula, United Kingdom and Ireland remain isolated. In 2002, the 
European Council set the target for all Member States to have a level of 
electricity interconnections equivalent to at least 10% of their installed production 
                                                 
6 Original name of the directive: Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources in the internal 
electricity market. 
7 For more details see Official Journal of the European Union L 283, 2001. 
8 Original name of the regulation: Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exhanges in 
electricity. 
9 For more details see Official Journal of the European Union L 176, 2003. 
10 Original name of the directive: Directive 2005/89/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 18 January 2006 concerning measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and 
infrastructure investment. 
11 For more details see Official Journal of the European Union L 33, 2006. 
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capacity by 2005. In 2010, nine member states still did not meet this target (Prša, 
2009; Granić et.al 2008).  
Electricity consumers, according to Anderson (2009), have not received 
the promised lower prices which are above relevant generation costs (due to 
increase in prices of oil and gas and especially due to lack of competition where 
the latter is a result of high market concentration). Also, great disparities (Figure 
1 and 2) still exist in electricity price levels among member states for both 
households and industrial consumers.  
Regarding household electricity prices, Denmark, Germany, Cyprus and 
Italy had the highest price levels in the first half of 2011 while the lowest 
electricity prices in this consumer category were registered in Bulgaria, Estonia 
and Romania. According to the data available on Eurostat, the total price level for 
















Source: Eurostat, 2011 
Figure 1: Electricity half-yearly prices for households (in €/kWh), excluding 
VAT, first half of 201112 
 
                                                 
12 Consumer band DC (household consumers with an annual consumption between 2.500 and 5.000 
kWh) was taken into consideration. 




















Source: Eurostat, 2011 
Figure 2: Electricity half-yearly prices for industry (in €/kWh), excluding 
VAT, first half of 201113 
When it comes to electricity price levels among member states for 
industrial consumers it can be noted that the highest electricity prices are present 
in Malta, Cyprus and Italy where, on the other hand, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, 
Finland and Romania have the lowest prices of electricity for industry. In the first 
half of 2011, the lowest level of electricity price paid by industrial consumers was 
0.0648 €/kWh in Bulgaria and the highest was 0.1800 €/kWh in Malta. 
High level of concentration on the electricity market can be evidenced 
by the fact that in only seven EU member states (Finland, Poland, United 
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Austria) market concentration in the 
year 2009, in terms of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, was reported as moderate 
(European Commission, 2011). This, in turn, constitutes entry barriers especially 
for small, independent suppliers.  
Artificially-low regulated prices (as opposed to free-market prices) that 
are below market prices hamper competition especially if these regulated prices 
are not well targeted and/or set at a level that does not allow costs to recuperate. 
In the year 2009, end-user price regulation continued to exist in 19 countries for 
households. Regulated prices for non-households were registered in 16 countries. 
The share of households supplied at regulated electricity prices was around 57% 
while the share of non-household consumers with regulated prices was 17%. 
The majority of electricity consumers still use the services of those 
suppliers who hold strong monopoly on the national market. According to the 
European Commission (2010; 2011), the average wholesale market share of 3 
                                                 
13 Consumer band IC (industrial consumers with an annual consumption between 500 and 2.000 kWh) 
was taken into consideration. Electricity prices for industrial consumers in Austria reffer to the second 
half of 2008. 
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biggest companies (by capacity) was around 76% while the total number of 
electricity generators with more than 5% share of generation capacity was 90 (or 
96 if Norway is included). In the electricity retail market, the market share of 
three largest companies was around 80% with the total number of nationwide 
suppliers of 1155 (namely, 1181 if Norway is included). Also, a large majority of 
electricity consumers did not embrace the possibility to select (switch to) another 
electricity supplier due to either lack of interest or absence of real competition in 
the supply segment. Even the European Commission (2010, p. 11) indicates that 
“it is difficult (...) to gain an overall picture of switching across member states” 
and that “switching levels vary considerably across Member States, with some 
mature markets – such as the UK – experiencing relatively high rates and a 
number of others showing little or no activity.” Specifically, the annual switching 
rates in United Kingdom are around 19% while, for instance, Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are dealing with switching rates that 
amount to no more than 1% on a yearly basis. 
Although the electricity market liberalization process is still far from 
being completed, we can draw several conclusions regarding electricity market 
achievements (Majstrović, 2008, p. 546):  
• there is no single vision for development of electricity market in 
the EU with sufficiently strong mechanisms for its implementation 
(the strategy for introduction of an internal electricity market did 
not achieve the expected results and sanctions for non-
implementation have been practically absent until recently) 
• national monopolies were replaced by new private 
megamonopolies – oligopolies 
• since market opening, cumulatively speaking, less than 20% of all 
buyers on average by country have changed their electricity 
supplier due to reasons such as the lack of interest (due to relatively 
low electricity costs) or due to absence of real competition in 
supply activity 
• differences in organization and operation of markets between 
member states are significant and the functioning of an internal 
European market is still unrealistic 
• institutional relations between member states are still unresolved 
which makes it difficult to implement an open electricity market 
• the question of supply security has not been raised seriously until 
recently 
• so far ownership relations and their impact on market development 
have not been regarded as a problem 
• there is a big disproportion between long periods of return on 
investments in the system and dependence of project profitability 
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on everyday market risks (this results in the absence of necessary 
activities and delay in construction of minimally required 
transmission and production capacities) 
                       1999                                          2007 
       
Source: Vlahinić-Dizdarević and Žiković (2011, p. 94) 
Figure 3: Electricity market liberalization upon the implementation of the 
Electricity Directive 
Probably the best overview on the development of the internal electricity 
market (Figure 3) was given by the European Commission (2010, p. 2) where it 
states that it is essential to correctly implement the rules of the current Electricity 
Directives in order to make market opening fully effective in terms of lowest 
possible electricity prices, security of supply and sustainability. However, due to 
improper implementation of the required legislation, in June 2009 the European 
Commission initiated infringement procedures against 25 member states for 
electricity (and against 21 member states for gas; this currently makes over 60 
infringement proceedings underway on the Second energy package alone)14 
where “key violations identified lack of transparency, insufficient coordination 
efforts by transmission system operators to make maximum interconnection 
capacity available, absence of regional cooperation, lack of enforcement action by 
the competent authorities in member states and the lack of adequate dispute 
settlement procedures.” 
After analysing the replies to the Letters of Formal Notice of the member 
states, the European Commission concluded that Denmark, Estonia Finland and 
Latvia had undertaken measures to align with the requirements of the Community 
                                                 
14 The first infringement procedures were initiated in 2006 against 20 member states but unfortunately 
the results were not too successful since in 2007 only few more countries achieved full electricity 
market liberalization as shown on Figure 3 (Vlahinić-Dizdarević and Žiković, 2011, p. 94). 
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law. For the rest of the member states, the Commission’s assessment pointed out 
only few violations had been properly addressed and decided in June 2010 to 
pursue the infringement procedures further and sent 35 Reasoned Opinions to the 
following member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and United Kingdom 
(European Commission, 2011). 
 
2.4. Introductory remarks on Directive 2009/72/EC 
Aforementioned first and second Electricity Directives were a part of the 
so-called first and second energy liberalization package of electricity (and gas) 
markets. In April 2009, a third package of legislative proposal seeking to further 
and finally liberalize the internal market of electricity (and gas), resolve structural 
failings, promote infrastructure investments, enhance competitiveness and protect 
the consumer has been adopted amending the second package. The third package 
focused on the issues related to the new unbundling regime, improving the 
functionality of the internal electricity (and gas) market, regulatory oversight and 
cooperation (namely, establishing the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators), enhancing the powers and independence of national regulators, 
measures to reinforce security of supply, efficient network cooperation, 
transparency and record keeping. March 2011, was set as a deadline when this 
new legislative proposals will have to be implemented in the EU member states 
(Bukša, 2010).  
The new Directive on electricity (Directive 2009/72/EC)15 by its 
definition establishes common rules for the generation, transmission, distribution 
and supply of electricity. Together with consumer protection provisions, it 
represents a way of improving and integrating competitive electricity markets in 
the Community. It lays down the rules related to the organisation and functioning 
of the electricity sector as well as open access to the market. It sets the criteria 
and procedures applicable to calls for tenders and the granting of authorisations 
and the operation of systems. It also lays down universal service obligations and 
the rights of electricity consumers as well as it clarifies competition requirements. 
In addition, it has been recognized that a secure supply of electricity is of vital 
importance for the development of European society, for the implementation of a 
sustainable climate change policy and for the fostering of competitiveness within 
the internal market. Also, cross-border interconnections should be further 
developed in order to secure the supply of all energy sources at the most 
competitive prices to household and industry consumers within the Community.16  
                                                 
15 Original name of the directive: Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive 2003/54/EC. 
16 For more details see Official Journal of the European Union L 211/55, 2009. 
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One of the most important features is the new Transmission System 
Operator (TSO) unbundling regime due to the fact that up to now legal and 
functional unbundling have not led to effective unbundling of the TSO’s. 
Effective TSO unbundling determines the overall result in constructing the 
electricity market since they manage key and vital facilities. There are three 
possible solutions: full ownership unbundling, independent system operator (ISO) 
and independent transmission operator (ITO). The full ownership unbundling 
model refers to the situation where transmission system operator and network 
owner must be completely separated from the vertically integrated company. In 
the independent system operator model the ISO is responsible for the 
maintenance of the networks. The ISO is separated and not subjected to the 
control of vertically integrated company and the network owner, it accepts full 
responsibility of a transmission system operator but its assets remain the property 
of the integrated company. Finally, the independent transmission operator (ITO) 
model is designed as a system where the transmission system operator remains 
within the vertically integrated company but with the related asset in its own 
possession. Under this regime the transmission system operator must not have 
shared services with the parent company nor should it transfer confidential and 
sensitive information to the generation and supply branches of the integrated 
company. In conclusion, it is expected that TSO’s will establish further 
cooperation which includes regional solidarity, reporting, development of 
commercial and grid codes, coordination of grid operation, investment planning 
as well as the expansion of the cross-border capacities in the EU (Bukša, 2010, p. 
785; Glanchant and Lévêque, 2006). 
The Directive 2009/72/EC will also ensure more effective regulatory 
supervision from truly independent national energy regulators. This will be done 
through strengthening and harmonising the competences and the independence of 
national regulators in order to ensure an effective and non-discriminatory access 
to the transmission networks. European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) is being established according to Regulation EC/713/200917 
as a new body which will complement the regulatory task of the national level 
and which is completely independent from the European Commission, national 
governments and energy companies. The reason for ACER being established goes 
in hand with the strengthening of the above mentioned regulatory powers as well 
with solving the gaps in cross-border projects regulation. Also, the Agency18 will 
be responsible for ensuring and promoting effective cooperation between national 
regulatory authorities at regional and Community level and to take decisions on 
cross-border issues if national regulators cannot agree or ask ACER to intervene. 
It will have to review the implementation of the EU network development plans 
and monitor the functioning of the internal market, including retail prices. 
Available network access, especially for electricity produced from renewable 
                                                 
17 Original name of the regulation: Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. 
18 For more details see Official Journal of the European Union L 211, 2009 
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energy sources and compliance with the consumer rights is also within ACER’s 
jurisdiction (European Parliament, 2009; ERGEG, 2009). 
Possible final convergence towards united and uniform internal 
electricity market still remains to be seen and thoroughly analysed since the 
implementation deadline for Directives and Regulations of the Third energy 
package was not until March 2011. According to the European Commission 
(2011, p. 3) in 2010, member states were actively engaged in preparing the 
transposition of the Directives of the Third energy package into their national 
laws and the Commission had consistently underlined the importance of a timely 
and correct transposition. In particular, the rules on unbundling of networks and 
especially the new rules on the independence and powers of national regulators 
are indispensable for a proper market functioning. So far the results of the 
transposition have not been reassuring. By 1 June 2011, not a single EU member 
state had yet notified its transposition measures to the European Commission 
although 4 member states had filed partial notification.19 The fact that the 
implementation deadline for TSO unbundling is not until March 2012 still does 
not allow us to give a possible (and final) passing grade regarding the internal 
electricity market creation.  
This comprehensive project still remains far from complete with many 
open infringements under the Second package, with the deliberate state 
interference motivated by a desire to support the so-called national champions 




3. ELECTRICITY MARKET IN CROATIA: REVIEW 
OF PAST EFFORTS AND NEW IMPLICATIONS  
When it comes to Croatian electricity market, it can be stated that 
complete transmission, distribution, supply and the majority of electricity 
production (as well as production, distribution and supply of thermal energy) are 
organized within the HEP Group, consisting of HEP d.d. as a leading, parent 
company and several subsidiaries or daughter-companies, which is fully owned 
by the Republic of Croatia.21 
                                                 
19 See further: The internal energy market – time to switch to higher gear, 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/legislation/doc/20110224_non_paper_internal_nergy_marke
t.pdf  (retrieved on April 28, 2011) 
20 For more details on the Community aquis regarding electricity sector restructuring see also 
Vlahinić-Dizdarević and Žiković (2011). 
21 According to the Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency (2008), the electricity generating facilities, 
mainly hydro and thermal power plants, are administrated by HEP Proizvodnja d.o.o. (89% of the 
overall capacity) which is one of subsidiary companies fully owned by HEP Group. This daughter-
company also has by far the largest share (86%) in the overall electrical energy generated in Croatia 
while a small number of facilities (with the share of 6% regarding the overall generating capacities 
and 1% of total electricity generated) are privately owned power plants that use wind power, photo 
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Energy sector reform started at the end of June in the year 2000 when 
the Croatian Government adopted the Energy Sector Reform Program. This 
Program determined the unbundling of fundamental activities, separation of 
complementary activities, formation of energy market and privatization of energy 
companies. One year later (in July 2001) a package of five energy legislations 
was passed in accordance with the European directives concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity (and gas) which were valid at that time, in 
particular Directive 96/92/EC (Udovičić, 2004). Three out of five of these laws 
(namely, Energy Act, Electricity Market Act and Regulation of Energy 
Operations Act22) defined the anticipated changes in the electricity sector. 
Rounding out the first phase of defining normative requirements for the 
electricity sector reform was completed in March 2002 with the adoption of the 
Privatization of HEP Act.23 The Energy Sector Development Strategy of the 
Republic of Croatia was adopted in April 2002 which, in terms of electricity 
sector, aimed to create a competitive and sustainable electricity system with high 
security of electricity supply starting from the fact that only independent, 
regulated and opened electricity market represents the most efficient and cost-
advantageous way in carrying out previously outlined objectives.24 
At the end of the 2004, Electricity Market Act and Regulation of Energy 
Operations Act were re-adopted together with the amended Energy Act25. This 
was done in accordance with the Second energy package, namely Directive 
2003/54/EC. Also, the new Energy Development Strategy of the Republic of 
Croatia was adopted in October 2009.26 This legal compliance enabled the 
creation of the Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency. Moreover, a new dynamics 
related to electricity market opening was defined through a definition of the so-
called preferred customer. The Electricity Market Act stipulated that from the day 
of its effect all customers with annual electricity consumption greater than 20 
GWh and all customers who are connected directly to the transmission network 
                                                                                                               
voltaic and small hydro power. Regarding electricity distribution and supply, although there are 
several licensed traders (for instance, Korlea d.o.o.), these services are also generally provided only by 
HEP Group. 
22 For more details regarding energy legislations see Official Gazette (2001), No. 68/01.   
23 For more details on the Privatization of HEP Act see Official Gazette (2002), No. 32/02 and HEP 
Annual report 2008. In the meantime, in February 2010, the Privatization of HEP Act was repealed 
because the privatization process was never initiated and because the third legislative package of EU 
energy directives (according to which organizational restructuring does not include questions of 
ownership or privatization) will result in new changes of energy laws in Croatia. The justification for 
such a move lies in a fact that in times of economic crisis the energy system should be held stable in 
terms of supply and avoiding price shocks. 
24 For more details on Energy Sector Development Strategy of the Republic of Croatia see Official 
Gazette (2002), No. 38/02 and Boromisa (2003). 
25 For more details on these amendments see Official Gazette (2004), No. 177/04. 
26 For more details regarding the new Energy Strategy of the Republic of Croatia see Official Gazette 
(2009), No. 130/09. 
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will obtain the status of preferred customer.27 The dynamics of electricity market 
opening was the following (Tominov, 2008, p. 283): 
? on July 1, 2006, the market was opened for customers with 
electricity consumption greater than 9 GWh which signified the 
possibility of choosing electricity suppliers for 106 entrepreneurs 
(they consumed approximately a billion kWh of electrical energy in 
the year 2006) and resulted in electricity market being opened at 
25% 
? on July 1, 2007, the market was opened for all customers in the 
category of entrepreneurs (i.e. for over 200.000 customers) whose 
consumption in the year 2006 amounted up to 8.5 billion kWh of 
electrical energy or 57% of total electricity consumption 
? on July 1, 2008, household customers obtained the preferred 
customer status as well which meant that electricity market became 
open for all electricity customers in Croatia  
After taking into account the progress in recent years regarding 
electricity market liberalization and having in mind the fact that it is formally 
harmonized with the requirements of the First and Second energy package, 
Croatia is still dealing with undeveloped market liberalization and a strictly 
government regulated market (Radulović, 2009, p. 518). 
However, the third Electricity Directive and its implementation will once 
again bring changes of the so-called energy laws (namely, the Electricity Market 
Act, the Regulation of Energy Operations Act and the Energy Act) since one of 
the most important features of the new electricity directive is the new 
Transmission System Operator unbundling regime combined with effective 
regulatory supervision. From the practical point of view, harmonization with the 
latest electricity directive implies the following (HEP Vjesnik, 2010): 
• introduction of market conditions in the electricity sector – 
electricity prices are to be determined by market mechanisms while 
setting the tariffs for regulated activities lies within the scope of an 
independent regulator28 
                                                 
27 As stated in Tešnjak, Banovac and Kuzle (2009), the effective date of the new Electricity Market 
Act was December 23, 2004, and by that date the limit that ensured the status of preferred customer 
was set to 40 GWh. There were only 14 customers eligible for the preferred customer status and, at 
that time, electricity market was opened only up to 9%. Setting down the limit to 20 GWh resulted in 
39 preferred customers with the market opening of 14%. 
28 When it comes to comparing the electricity prices paid by households in the EU and Croatia, 
according to Vlahinić-Dizdarević and Žiković (2011), the price of electricity in Croatia is 
considerably lower than the EU-27 average and still has an important social dimension. Although 
declaratively prices are formed on the market, the Government is the one that approves the final rates. 
The situation regarding electricity prices for industrial consumers is quite opposite. Electricity prices 
for industry in Croatia have reached the levels paid by industrial consumers in the European Union. 
This, in turn, is the result of the so-called cross-subsidies. This relic of the past refers to a situation 
when lower prices for households were compensated with higher energy prices for industry. This, in 
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• increased authority, responsibility, competence and independence 
of the Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency and cooperation with 
the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
• definition of “energy poverty”, consumer protection and the 
establishment of a new system of social support29 
• separation of the transmission system operator from commercial 
activities according to either ISO, TSO or ITO concept30 
• distribution system operator must be independent from other 
activities within the vertically integrated company (legally, 
organizationally, in terms of accounting and management) while 
ownership separation has not yet been conditioned31 
• efficient and transparent application of laws and regulations at all 
levels 
• increased investment in infrastructure due to power plants 
deterioration and the need for new generating capacities32  
Restructuring of the electricity sector is an imperative but it has to be 
implemented in accordance with the degree of market development, sector’s 
history, national energy sources and the overall economic interests.  
                                                                                                               
turn, hinders the competitive position of Croatian companies in comparison with those coming from 
the EU.  
29 Especially when it comes to neutralizing the negative economic impact of cost-reflective energy 
(electricity) prices on socially vulnerable households (Vlahinić-Dizdarević and Žiković, 2010, p. 51). 
30 The Study on harmonization of the Croatian energy sector and energy legislation with the energy 
regulations of the European Union (EKONERG, 2010) prefers the TSO model due to reasons such as 
the operator being fully independent, easier regulatory supervision, correct electricity prices due to 
market competition, increasing number of competing suppliers which allows customers better and 
wider choice, protection of socially vulnerable consumers etc. HEP, however, as one of the key 
energy companies suggests that the restructuring of the transmission system operator should be done 
according to the ITO model. The arguments for this type of unbundling concept are grounded in the 
following: smallest impact on the financial-economic status of HEP Group, mildest possible effects in 
regards to social aspects of employment protection, least compromised system security while the level 
of investment will not be worsened.  
31 Implementation of the third Electricity Directive also applies to other activities in the electricity 
sector, namely electricity generation, supply and trade. See Bukša (2011, p. 302) for more details 
regarding the possible restructuring pattern of the HEP Group. 
32 In the period 2013 – 2020, approximately 30% of previously installed capacity will be shut down 
which rises the need for new production capacities. Regarding hydroelectric power plants, it is 
expected that newly built facilities by 2020 will amount to 300 MW. In the matter of thermal power 
plants, additional 2400 MW of new capacity must be build by 2020. Also, cogeneration units with the 
power of at least 300 MW will be constructed by 2020. According to the Energy Development 
Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (see Official Gazette, 2009), it is estimated that the overall 
investments in the Croatian energy sector will amount to 15 billion €. The most demanding 
investments are and will be the ones directed to electricity sector. Their share in total investments is 
about 60% or 9 billion €. 
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According to some authors33, Croatian electricity sector even after the 
restructuring process must remain a bearer of economic growth and development 
as well as employment in the forthcoming period. Privatization of HEP, although 
postponed until Croatia’s entry in the EU, should be gradual with the intention of 
attracting private capital in the segment of electricity generation (either on co-
ownership or concession basis) in order to diversify electricity supply, to increase 
competition and to maintain price stability.  
   
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Motivation for the reform of the electricity supply industry and the 
related regulatory regime vary from country to country but, generally speaking, it 
is guided by a desire to make the electricity sector more efficient through the 
introduction of competition among market participants. Improved productivity, as 
a result of market competition, includes better rationalization of labour and fuel 
costs in electricity production and supply, top investment decisions and allocation 
of risk as well as improved quality of services for electricity consumers.  
The development of electricity market in the European Union, however, 
can be described as a long and diversified process that has not yet been fully 
completed. This can only partly be attributed to different organizational, 
ownership, technological, historical, geographical and the overall social and legal 
heritage in EU member states. The main reason lies in a fact that every country in 
these restructuring and market opening processes seeks maximum protection of 
their own economic interests. Even directives regarding the liberalization of 
electricity markets still do not result with all of the expected outcomes and 
benefits.  
Regular and timely transposition of the third Electricity Directive comes 
as a precondition for the final development of an open, integrated and competitive 
electricity market. Together with the gas market, this constitutes a priority in 
achieving competitive energy prices, energy security and sustainability. In 
particular, electricity supply industry significantly contributes to the gross 
domestic product through increased investment, exports and construction of new 
production capacity which somewhat justifies the maximum protection of 
economic interests. However, the implementation of the rules on unbundling of 
networks and the ones regarding the independence and powers of national 
regulators are of significant importance for a proper functioning of the internal 
electricity market.  
Therefore, the Third energy package and the accompanying Electricity 
Directive should lead to the achievement of the proclaimed goals and benefits for 
all market participants. This, in turn, can only be achieved with a collective effort 
                                                 
33 For instance, Bukša (2010; 2011), Vlahinić-Dizdarević and Žiković (2011), Vlahinić-Dizdarević 
and Galović (2007).  
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starting from national legislative and competition authorities, energy regulators, 
producers and suppliers together with consumer organizations. At the end of the 
day, only joint activities and balanced interests can make the entire EU and 
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DIREKTIVE O ELEKTRIČNOJ ENERGIJI I RAZVOJ 
UNUTARNJEG TRŽIŠTA ELEKTRIČNE ENERGIJE U EU34 
 
Sažetak 
Liberalizacija elektroenergetskog tržišta u EU služi stvaranju konkurentnog 
tržišta ne bi li se povećala ekonomska efikasnost i smanjila uloga države. U 
zemljama članicama EU godinama je elektroenergetski sektor bio organiziran 
kao prirodni vertikalno integrirani monopol u državnome vlasništvu. To se 
pokazalo neučinkovitim u smislu osiguranja (konkurentne) tržišne cijene 
električne energije. Uz tehnološki napredak u proizvodnji i prijenosu električne 
energije, reforma elektroenergetskog sektora postala je moguća i neizbježna. 
Naime, sve proizvodne i razvojne aktivnosti oslanjaju se na energiju, tj. 
električnu energiju, čime ovaj oblik energije postaje nezamjenjiv u odnosu na 
druge energente. S obzirom na porast stupnja korištenja električne energije te na 
međupovezanost ekonomskog rasta i razvoja elektroenergetskog sektora, važno je 
detaljno elaborirati dosljednost tog procesa u EU unutar konteksta samih 
direktiva o električnoj energiji. Razlog se, naime, nalazi u činjenici da upravo 
provedba tih direktiva o električnoj energiji, zajedno s ostalim popratnim 
propisima, predstavlja sredstvo stvaranja potpuno funkcionalnog unutarnjeg 
tržišta električne energije. Spomenuto vrijedi i u slučaju hrvatskog tržišta 
električne energije. 
Ključne riječi: tržište električne energije, liberalizacija, direktive o električnoj 
energiji, Europska unija, Hrvatska. 
JEL klasifikacija: L94 
                                                 
34 Rad je nastao u okviru znanstvenog projekta “Ekonomski učinci regulatornih reformi 
elektroenergetskog sektora”, br. 081-0361557-1455, koji se provodi uz potporu Ministarstva znanosti, 
obrazovanja i športa Republike Hrvatske.  
